advani-book

Kargil War was decisive victory: Advani

BY MRITYUNJAY BOSE

Describing the Kargil War as a "decisive victory" for India on military and diplomatic front, former Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani lashes out at the Congress posing a series of uncomfortable questions for the latter to handle.

However, he admitted that the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee did not implement one of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee – which had called for bifurcation of two posts held by Brajesh Mishra – that of full-time National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister.

"Victory in the Kargil War was one of the finest hours in the annals of India's armed forces," Advani, currently Leader of Opposition and BJP-led NDA's PM-candidate, wrote in his memoirs – 'My Country, My Life'.

However, in the criticism of the Sonia Gandhi-led Congress, Advani, who was also country's Home Minister during the NDA regime, said: "My party had consistently maintained that India's victory in the Kargil War was a national accomplishment that transcended political barriers. After India's triumph in the 1971 war with Pakistan, which led to the liberation of Bangladesh, the Jana Sangh had demonstrated its readiness to rise above political considerations by profusely congratulating the government of the day, led by Indira Gandhi. Unfortunately, the Congress reaction, both during and in the immediate aftermath of the Kargil War, was diametrically different. It did not have the magnanimity to appreciate a national success achieved during the rule of a BJP-led government."

Recalling the sequence of events of Kargil intrusion, he points out that in the second week of May (1999), the PM called him and a few other senior ministers for an informal meeting to discuss 'some urgent matter'. The Army has informed him about some strange movement of unidentified people crossing the LoC in Kargil district in the Ladakh region of J&K. It being high altitude and rugged region with sparse population, the intrusions were first detected, quite accidently, by local shepherds on May 3, who were occasional informers of the Army in the Batalik sector. The infiltrators were heavily armed and had entrenched themselves in the heights of 16,000-18,000 ft along a 150-km stretch highway that lay below.

Consequently, Defence Minister George Fernandes visited the area on May 12-14. On May 26, the Indian Army launched counter offensive, which was named 'Operation Vijay'.
Consequently, Vajpayee also spoke to his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif – the latter held General Pervez Musharraf responsible.

The objective of Pakistan, he points out in his book, were manifold: (1) to choke the Srinagar-Leh highway, since it was the main supply line for Indian troops in Ladakh, (2) for force Indian troops to withdraw from the Siachin Glacier, (3) to use the crisis to strengthen its own bargaining position so that India could be compelled to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute on favourable terms, (4) Kargil War to further incident militancy in J&K, and (5) to internationalise the Kashmir issue, projecting Kargil as a potential trigger for nuclear showdown.

Elaborating on the Kargil operations, he said that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had a clear brief for the Indian Air Force – 'Do not cross the LoC'. "With a combined and concerted affect of infantry and air attacks, India quickly neutralized Pakistan's initial gains. With the tables turned on them, it was now turn of the Pakistani troops' to be totally surprised," he wrote. Finally, after 74 days, 'Operation Vijay' became 'vijayi' (triumphant) on July 26, which is celebrated as Kargil Victory Day.

Praising the leadership of Vajpayee, he wrote: "Atalji's leadership during the Kargil episode was outstanding. Never once did he seem ruffled by the unexpected turn of events…….his greatest triumph was that in the Kargil War, in contrast to the four previous wars fought under the leadership of Congress PMs – 1948, 1962, 1965 and 1971 – not one inch of Indian territory was either lost in the battlefield or 'negotiated away' in the diplomatic field.'


Touching upon the diplomatic arena, he pointed out: "Diplomacy, it is sid, is a continuation of war by other means. This may not be true in every situation. But it certainly was in the case of Kargil War. If India's jawans were at their heroic best on the battlefield, our Foreign Service professionals were at their best at diplomatic arena."

He recalled how on June 11, Minister of State for External Affairs Jaswant Singh addressed a press conference on the event of his Pakistani counterpart Sartaj Aziz and released two recorded conversations (of May 26 and 29) between Gen Musharaff (now Pakistani President) and his Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz. The first conversation made it clear that Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed had been briefed about the Kargil conflict, along with the Corps Commanders. In the second conversation, Musharraf explicitly stated Pakistan's war objectives, preceding any diplomatic engagement with India.

Now he states what was made clear to Pakistan on June 12 – (1) immediate vacation of the aggression, (2) reaffirmation of the validity of LoC, (3) abandoning cross-border terrorism, (4) dismantling the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and (5) reaffirmation of the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. "India's mission did a splendid job of presenting before foreign governments a convincing case of Pakistan's aggression in Kargil," he writes.


India's voluntary decision of not crossing LoC was applauded – and, by extension, India's stand on resolution of Kashmir issue was supported by the US, the European Union, G8 nations and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. Even China refused to come to Pakistan's rescue during the Kargil War. Benazir Bhutto, the late Prime Minister and President of Pakistan People's Party described Kargil as 'Pakistan's biggest blunder'. On October 12, Gen Musharraf ousted Sharif in a coup.

Advani goes on to add that on February 23, 2000, Fernandes tabled the report of the four-member Kargil Review Committee chaired by noted defence analyst K Subrahmanyam. The committee had held over 100 meetings. He points out that most of the recommendations of the committee were implemented.

However, he points out one of the few recommendations not accepted was regarding the National Security Council, which had been set up by the Vajpayee government in April 1999 – was having a separate National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to the PM. "Many senior ministers in the government and I felt that there was much merit in this suggestion. We repeatedly urged the Prime Minister to bifurcate the two posts held by Brajesh Mishra. Atalji, however, had a different view and did not implement this recommendation. It was of course, the PM's prerogative to do so. In my view, the clubbing together of two critical responsibilities, each requiring focused attention, did not contribute to harmony at the highest levels of governance."


POSERS TO CONGRESS

** Have they done any introspection over Prime Minister (Pandit Jawaharlal) Nehru's handling of the Kashmir issue during the first Indo-Pak war in 1947-48? He unilaterally declared ceasefire on January 1, 1949, when our armed forces were chasing the invaders to a point where India could have recovered the entire occupied of Jammu & Kashmir. Did Nehru take Parliament or our countrymen into confidence before 'gifting' away 83,100 sq kms of our territory to Pakistan? Did he evolve a national consensus – or even a consensus within his own Cabinet – before needlessly referring Kashmir issue to the United Nations?

** After India's debacle in the Chinese aggression in 1962, the Congress party issued a circular that termed anyone as traitors who 'are not being respectful enough, helpful enough and prayerful enough towards Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. It is wrong to permit Opposition parties to take advantage of the emergency fro throwing mud against the Congress'. Veteran Swatantra Party MP, Prof N G Ranga, cited this circular during the Lok Sabha debate on the Defence of India Bill in 1962. Can they deny this?

** Will they explain why the Henderson Brooks report, which did an operations review of India's defeat in the 1962 war, has not been de-classified even after the passage of 45 years? It is because the authors of this official report, two officers of the Indian armed forces Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig P S Bhagat, commandant of Indian Military Academy, were believed to be critical of the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon?


** Will they explain to the nation why the Congress government timidly returned Haji Pir, which had been recovered by the Indian Army in the 1965 war, to aggressor Pakistan at the negotiating table in Tashkent in January 1966?

** Will they tell the nation why Indira Gandhi did not try for a full and final settlement of the Kashmir issue after India's decisive victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war, especially when he had as many as 93,000 Pakistani POWs in our custody?

** Above all, can we recall whether the international community supported India's stand on the Kashmir issue as widely and strongly at any time before the Kargil War.

(This report was first published in The Maharashtra Herald-Pune)