advani on nuclear tests
Advani had tears of emotions after Pokharan-II
For Leader of Opposition L K Advani, the Pokharan-II nuclear tests were extremely emotional moment in his life. But the former Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister lashes out at the Congress and Communists for criticizing the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) for conducting the tests, who he says has been a major contributor of national resurgence – and also touches on the negative aspect of the Indo-US nuclear deal.
"The Vajpayee government got down to the task of governance in right earnest. The first and foremost task was to make India a nuclear weapons power – a vital commitment in every election manifesto of the BJP since 1967," he writes in his memoirs 'My Country, My Life'.
"Our government's greatest achievement was instilling a sense of pride, confidence and hope in Indians, both within and outside India. A major contributor to this national resurgence was of course, a historic event that took place on May 11, 1998, conforming our resolve to make India 'shaktishali' (strong), 'samruddha' (prosperous) and 'swabhimani' (self-confident)," he writes.
It was, he says, on the auspicious occasion of Buddha Purnima, the day of Gautam Buddha's birth, when this long standing commitment of the BJP was translated into reality. On that very morning, Atal Bihari Vajpayee had shifted residence from 7 Safdarjung Road to Prime Minister's official residence: 7 Racecourse Road. The mandatory puja had been completed but the day was destined to become memorable for him, and for the nation, for another reason.
Sitting in the PM's living room were seven of us – Atalji, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Jaswant Singh, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha, the PM's Political Advisor Pramod Mahajan, his Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra and myself, he recalls, "We were eagerly awaiting a message from the deserts of Rajasthan – to be precise, from Pokharan."
The message came, slightly before 4 pm, on a specially installed top-security telephone line: 'Tests Successful'. "India's nuclear scientists had succeeded in conducting three simultaneous nuclear explosions, heralding India's emergence as a nuclear weapons state. None of us in the room could control our emotions. I perhaps the weakest in this regard, had tears in my eyes," Advani recalls.
Vajpayee thanked the scientists who made it happen – in particular Dr A P J Abdul Kalam, Head of Defence Research and Development Organisation (who later became President), Dr R Chidambaram, Head of Department of Atomic Energy, Dr Anil Kakodkar, then the Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (currently DAE Seretary) and Dr K Santhanam, Chief Advisor to DRDO. Shortly, thereafter, there was a media announcement. Subsequently, two more nuclear tests were carried out on May 13.
To understand the sentiment fully, it is necessary to know what the codename of the tests, 'Operation Shakti' conveys to the Indian mind. "For over thousand years, India had been a victim of foreign rule due to the superior military power of the invaders. Therefore, when India won freedom from the British rule in 1947, national defence become the highest priority for nationalists so that the shame of defeat and enslavement was never repeated. Hence, self reliance in developing weaponry capable of defending the nation, in the face of gravest of threats, became an unshakeable principle for them," he writes and points out that when Indira Gandhi's government carried out a nuclear test on May 18, 1974, his party complimented the government unhesistantly.
He writes that within a fortnight of Pokharan-II, Pakistan followed suit by conducting underground nuclear explosions at its Chagai testing range in Baluchistan. However, there were significant differences between the nuclear security policies of India and Pakistan. Unlike Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme which is entirely India-centric, India's is not Pakistan-centric, it takes into account the present and future challenges, both regional and global, to our national security. Unlike Pakistan, which does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, India does. Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure has been built largely with Chinese assistance, with considerable contribution from clandestine methods, whereas India's is based on self reliance, with an impeccable recod of its dealings with international partners. Indeed, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, founder of Pakistan's nuclear programme, confessed in January 2004 to his involvement in nuclear weapons technology transfers from Pakistan to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
After criticizing the stand of Congress and Communists, advani writes that the debate about India's nuclear deterrent did not end in 1998. It resurfaced in a far more politically explosive manner in 2007 in the context of Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's decision to enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. "It is an unequal deal, promising the illusion of energy security, but, in reality, seeking to undermine India's national security. It undoes India's proud achievements in Pokharan I and II and compromises India's sovereignty in matters of strategic nuclear policies," he writes.
"…whereas Indira Gandhi did India proud with Pokharan I in 1974 and Atal Bihari Vajpayee brought greater strength and pride with Pokharan II in 1998, the Indo-US nuclear deal ensures that no future Indian Prime Minister would be able to conduct Pokharan III even if considerations of national defence necessitated such as step." This, he says, because the Hyde Act passed by the American legislature, which would govern the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement, has in-built provisions for "punitive measures" against India, if it conducted fresh nuclear tests.
For Leader of Opposition L K Advani, the Pokharan-II nuclear tests were extremely emotional moment in his life. But the former Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister lashes out at the Congress and Communists for criticizing the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) for conducting the tests, who he says has been a major contributor of national resurgence – and also touches on the negative aspect of the Indo-US nuclear deal.
"The Vajpayee government got down to the task of governance in right earnest. The first and foremost task was to make India a nuclear weapons power – a vital commitment in every election manifesto of the BJP since 1967," he writes in his memoirs 'My Country, My Life'.
"Our government's greatest achievement was instilling a sense of pride, confidence and hope in Indians, both within and outside India. A major contributor to this national resurgence was of course, a historic event that took place on May 11, 1998, conforming our resolve to make India 'shaktishali' (strong), 'samruddha' (prosperous) and 'swabhimani' (self-confident)," he writes.
It was, he says, on the auspicious occasion of Buddha Purnima, the day of Gautam Buddha's birth, when this long standing commitment of the BJP was translated into reality. On that very morning, Atal Bihari Vajpayee had shifted residence from 7 Safdarjung Road to Prime Minister's official residence: 7 Racecourse Road. The mandatory puja had been completed but the day was destined to become memorable for him, and for the nation, for another reason.
Sitting in the PM's living room were seven of us – Atalji, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Jaswant Singh, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha, the PM's Political Advisor Pramod Mahajan, his Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra and myself, he recalls, "We were eagerly awaiting a message from the deserts of Rajasthan – to be precise, from Pokharan."
The message came, slightly before 4 pm, on a specially installed top-security telephone line: 'Tests Successful'. "India's nuclear scientists had succeeded in conducting three simultaneous nuclear explosions, heralding India's emergence as a nuclear weapons state. None of us in the room could control our emotions. I perhaps the weakest in this regard, had tears in my eyes," Advani recalls.
Vajpayee thanked the scientists who made it happen – in particular Dr A P J Abdul Kalam, Head of Defence Research and Development Organisation (who later became President), Dr R Chidambaram, Head of Department of Atomic Energy, Dr Anil Kakodkar, then the Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (currently DAE Seretary) and Dr K Santhanam, Chief Advisor to DRDO. Shortly, thereafter, there was a media announcement. Subsequently, two more nuclear tests were carried out on May 13.
To understand the sentiment fully, it is necessary to know what the codename of the tests, 'Operation Shakti' conveys to the Indian mind. "For over thousand years, India had been a victim of foreign rule due to the superior military power of the invaders. Therefore, when India won freedom from the British rule in 1947, national defence become the highest priority for nationalists so that the shame of defeat and enslavement was never repeated. Hence, self reliance in developing weaponry capable of defending the nation, in the face of gravest of threats, became an unshakeable principle for them," he writes and points out that when Indira Gandhi's government carried out a nuclear test on May 18, 1974, his party complimented the government unhesistantly.
He writes that within a fortnight of Pokharan-II, Pakistan followed suit by conducting underground nuclear explosions at its Chagai testing range in Baluchistan. However, there were significant differences between the nuclear security policies of India and Pakistan. Unlike Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme which is entirely India-centric, India's is not Pakistan-centric, it takes into account the present and future challenges, both regional and global, to our national security. Unlike Pakistan, which does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, India does. Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure has been built largely with Chinese assistance, with considerable contribution from clandestine methods, whereas India's is based on self reliance, with an impeccable recod of its dealings with international partners. Indeed, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, founder of Pakistan's nuclear programme, confessed in January 2004 to his involvement in nuclear weapons technology transfers from Pakistan to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
After criticizing the stand of Congress and Communists, advani writes that the debate about India's nuclear deterrent did not end in 1998. It resurfaced in a far more politically explosive manner in 2007 in the context of Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's decision to enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. "It is an unequal deal, promising the illusion of energy security, but, in reality, seeking to undermine India's national security. It undoes India's proud achievements in Pokharan I and II and compromises India's sovereignty in matters of strategic nuclear policies," he writes.
"…whereas Indira Gandhi did India proud with Pokharan I in 1974 and Atal Bihari Vajpayee brought greater strength and pride with Pokharan II in 1998, the Indo-US nuclear deal ensures that no future Indian Prime Minister would be able to conduct Pokharan III even if considerations of national defence necessitated such as step." This, he says, because the Hyde Act passed by the American legislature, which would govern the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement, has in-built provisions for "punitive measures" against India, if it conducted fresh nuclear tests.
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